How do we use the past to predict the future in oculomotor search?  by Vincent, Benjamin T.
Vision Research 74 (2012) 93–101Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Vision Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /v isresHow do we use the past to predict the future in oculomotor search?
Benjamin T. Vincent
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, UKa r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 16 January 2012
Received in revised form 26 May 2012
Available online 15 August 2012
Keywords:
Visual search
Prediction
Eye movements
Spatial prior
Visual attention
Bayesian inference
Sequential effects
Priming
Transient facilitation0042-6989/$ - see front matter  2012 Elsevier Ltd. A
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2012.08.001
E-mail address: b.t.vincent@dundee.ac.uk
URL: http://www.inferencelab.comA variety of ﬁndings suggest that when conducting visual search, we can exploit cues that are statistically
related to a target’s location. But is this the result of heuristic mechanisms or an internal model that
tracks the statistics of the environment? Here, connections are made between the two explanations,
and four models are assessed to probe the mechanisms underlying prediction in search. Participants con-
ducted a simple gaze-contingent search task with ﬁve conditions, each of which consists of different com-
binations of 1st and 2nd order statistics. People’s exploration behaviour adapted to the statistical rules
governing target behaviour. Behaviour was most consistent with a model that represents transitions from
one location to another, and that makes the underlying assumption that the world is dynamic. This
assumption that the world is changeable could not be overridden despite task instruction and nearly
1 h of exposure to unchanging statistics. This means that while people may be suboptimal in some exper-
imental contexts, it may be because their internal mental model makes assumptions that are adaptive in
a complex, changeable world.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
When we conduct visual search we can use at least two classes
of information: presently available visual cues, and predictions
based upon the past. While we may rely upon both factors in
real-world search, this study focusses upon the predictive mecha-
nisms underlying saccadic targeting. It is clear that memory of the
past can inﬂuence search in a variety of ways (see reviews by Shore
and Klein (2000), Woodman and Chun (2006), and Fecteau and
Munoz (2003)). One notable example is seen in contextual cuing:
when a target’s location is predictable given particular arrange-
ment of simple distracter shapes, seeing that distracter context
again leads to lower search times (Chun & Jiang, 1998) through
more accurate saccadic targeting (Peterson & Kramer, 2001). Sim-
ilar spatial expectations can be elicited by pictures of natural
scenes (Eckstein, Drescher, & Shimozaki, 2006; Neider & Zelinsky,
2006; Torralba et al., 2006).
Saccade latencies also provide insight into saccadic planning: in
temporal evidence accumulation approaches such as the LATER
model (Carpenter & Williams, 1995), shorter saccade latencies
could be due (among other things) to an increased prior expecta-
tion about a target’s location. Carpenter and Williams (1995) and
Carpenter (2004) found that when a target had a spatial bias to ap-
pear in one location more often than another, saccadic latencies
were reduced to the high probability location. This was explainedll rights reserved.as changes in initial activation levels of each location, in other
words, past experience of a target’s previous spatial locations con-
tributed to a prediction of where the next target would occur.
But can these internal predictions be combined with ambiguous
visual cues of a target’s location? Liston and Stone (2008) used a
saccadic choice task where subjects tried to ﬁxate a luminance-
deﬁned target where the probability of the target being on the left
or right of ﬁxationwasmanipulated. Oculometric functions showed
that as the visual discriminability decreased, therewas an increased
chance to ﬁxate the high probability location. This study was nota-
ble for showing that saccadic decisions were the outcome of com-
bining internal spatial predictions with visual evidence.
These saccadic latency and choice experiments suggest that the
occulomotor system can track (or at least receives input from a
system that can) target location statistics, also termed a spatial
bias or 1st order statistics. However, the ability to learn spatial
biases has been questioned in other experimental paradigms. Be-
cause target location repetitions are more likely to occur in high
probability regions, a bias to attend the previous target location
(an effect dubbed transient facilitation, or location priming) could
perhaps account for apparent learning of spatial biases (Shore &
Klein, 2000; Walthew & Gilchrist, 2006). In one experiment, Wal-
thew and Gilchrist (2006) sought evidence that we could learn a
spatial bias if the location repetition confound was removed. If
we could, then search should have been facilitated in high proba-
bility regions even if location repeats never occurred. While they
did not discount a role for statistical learning in overt search, their
data did not support any spatial bias learning effect above and be-
yond that caused by transient facilitation.
Fig. 1. Conceptual overview of prediction in search with the four models examined.
Spatial biases could be learnt with a simple level of activity for each spatial location
(4 in this case). Representing movement over time requires a representation of
4  4 units to represent all possible transitions. This is schematically represented by
units encoding a target’s location on trial t location (row) and on trial t  1
(column). If one assumes the world is static, then the models amount to keeping a
running frequency count. However, if one assumes the world is dynamic, activity in
the representational units decays, such that there is a balance between more recent
and more historic observations.
94 B.T. Vincent / Vision Research 74 (2012) 93–101Recent work suggests that we can in fact learn spatial biases.
Druker and Anderson (2010) drew targets from a continuous distri-
bution across the screen, rather than a few discreet locations: this
afforded a strong spatial bias but a near-zero chance of location
repetitions on consecutive trials. The found that a chromatic dis-
crimination task was faster in high probability regions and con-
cluded that we can learn and utilise spatial probabilities
governing a target’s location. Jones and Kaschak (2012) addressed
some methodological concerns of the experiments by Walthew
and Gilchrist (2006) and in a modiﬁed replication, they showed
that ﬁrst saccades were directed more often to a high probability
side of the display, even in the absence of location repeats.
If 1st order statistics deﬁne the probability of where a target oc-
curs in space, 2nd order statistics describe this spatial probability,
but dependent upon the previous target location. As such, they sta-
tistically describe how targets move over time, how they transition
from one location to another. Nummela, Lovejoy, and Krauzlis
(2008) used a Markov model to probabilistically determine a re-
warded location, contingent upon the previous rewarded location.
People’s saccades were directed to each location roughly in propor-
tion to the probability that a location would be rewarded, despite
no visual cues being available indicating that they had learnt these
2nd order trial-to-trial contingencies to a certain degree. There is
also evidence from within-trial saccadic targeting that 2nd order
statistics can be learnt. Farrell et al. (2009) showed within-trial
inhibition of return is abolished by manipulating the environmen-
tal statistics to make location repetitions more likely. Within a
temporal evidence accumulation approach, they found evidence
that changing the environmental statistics caused changes in
threshold activation: in their model this was indistinguishable
from altered baseline activations, i.e. prior expectations adapted
to the environmental statistics.
If people’s internal model of the world only represents spatial
locations, then they should be capable of learning 1st order statis-
tics. However, to learn the 2nd order statistics of how targets move
over time would require a more complex internal representation
that can encode transition probabilities. The ﬁrst aim of this work
is to examine whether we can learn these 1st or 2nd order statis-
tics, which in turn allows us to infer the nature of the internal pre-
dictive model (see Fig. 1). While there is a suggestion that we learn
1st and 2nd order statistics simultaneously (also see Wilder, Jones,
& Mozer, 2009; Yu & Cohen, 2009), these are investigated sepa-
rately here.
A second aim of this work is to examine the mechanism
underlying how we update our predictive model based on past
experience. One pertinent model was proposed by Maljkovic
and Nakayama (1996) who examined location priming in a vi-
sual discrimination task. Reaction time beneﬁts were seen on tri-
als where the target repeated its location. Because these
transient facilitatory effects persisted over the experiment de-
spite not being beneﬁcial, Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) con-
cluded that they were caused by a robust mechanism that
must be beneﬁcial in other more typical situations. They pro-
posed a resistor–capacitor circuit model where the activity of a
unit increases every time a target occurs at the corresponding
location, but all activity decays over time.
It is worth noting that the resistor–capacitor model proposed by
Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996) bears remarkable similarity to a
leaky integration model proposed by Anderson and Carpenter
(2006). They examined how prior expectations in saccadic choice
are updated based upon past experiences. By changing the spatial
probabilities at a particular point during a block of trials, saccade
latencies were observed to change according to the new spatial po-
sition bias. The time-course of this change indicated the rate (k) at
which old observations of spatial bias were overturned in favour of
more recent observations. If the real spatial probabilities are de-ﬁned by p, then their leaky-integrator model estimated these with
a set of activities q with the following update equation:
qn ¼ ð1 kÞqn1 þ kI: ð1Þ
Here, I is a vector of inputs which increased unit activity by 0 (at
distracter locations) or 1 (at target locations). This update equation
is a rational way to update beliefs if one assumes the world is dy-
namic, that is, that there is a belief that the probabilities governing
a target’s location change (see Anderson & Carpenter, 2006). This
can be compared to the very similar update equation of a resis-
tor–capacitor circuit proposed by Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996),
qn ¼ ð1 kÞqn1 þ I: ð2Þ
One important difference with this equation is that if k = 0 then no
information about the past is discarded and the model amounts to
keeping a running frequency count of where targets occur in the
past, this in turn would cause q to be the maximum likelihood esti-
mate of p (Anderson & Goodman, 1957). Eq. (2) with k = 0 would be
an optimal way of updating beliefs if the world was static, where
target behaviours do not change over time.
To summarise, the second aim of this work is to examine
whether people assume the world is static or dynamic. This is
important because if the world is static, then maintaining the
assumption that the world is dynamic would lead to a sub-optimal
use of observations. This is simply because estimates of long run
relative frequencies are being made from a smaller sample. As well
as examining if people can learn 1st and 2nd order statistics, this
work assesses people’s assumptions about living whether they
are observing a static world (Eq. (2), with k = 0) or dynamic world
(Eq. (1), where k is a free parameter).
Experiment 1 answers these questions by comparing search
behaviour of four models (see Fig. 1) that can either represent spa-
tial locations (a 1st order model) or transitions (a 2nd order mod-
el). Additionally, both types of models are tested with the
assumption that the environmental statistics are static, or dy-
namic. Five different search conditions are used in order to see
which model provides the most robust account of people’s occulo-
motor search behaviour over a range of different sets of environ-
mental statistics. Experiment 2 exposed people to nearly 1 h of
B.T. Vincent / Vision Research 74 (2012) 93–101 95searching in the presence of an unchanging spatial bias. Given this
empirical observation of unchanging statistics and task instruction
that target behaviour will not change, can we overcome the
assumption that the world is dynamic in order to maximise
performance?2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Ten undergraduates with normal or corrected to normal vision
participated in the study for course credit. Participants searched in
ﬁve blocks of 100 trials in 1 session each. Conditions (blocks) were
run in a random order. No participants were excluded from
analysis.
Participants were informed that they must locate a target and
that its location may be guided by a hidden rule. They were told
that this rule was probabilistic, so it is impossible to predict the
targets location with complete certainty even if they correctly
guessed the underlying rules. In contrast to Nummela, Lovejoy,
and Krauzlis (2008), explicitly understanding of the rule was not
assessed. Participants were instructed to do their best to predict
where the target would appear next and to attempt to explore
the locations in order of most likely to less likely. Importantly, they
were informed that during an experimental blocks, the rule did not
change.
2.1.2. Equipment
Stimuli were displayed on a CRT monitor with resolution set to
1280  1024 and refresh rate of 85 Hz. The room was held in con-
stant dim lighting conditions. A chin-rest resulted in a stable view-
ing distance of 63.5 cm. An SR Research Eyelink 1000 eye tracker
was used to track the position of the right eye. A 9-point calibra-
tion procedure was used at the start of each experimental block:
calibration was repeated if a spatial accuracy worse than ±0.5
was obtained. Default parameters were used in the saccade and
ﬁxation detection algorithm provided by SR Research.
2.1.3. Stimuli and procedure
People ﬁrst had a practice session of 50 trials where the target
location was unpredictable (condition 1). The data recorded from
this practice session was discarded. The experiment consisted of
5 blocks, 1 of each condition, conducted in a randomised order
for each participant. Fig. 2 shows the trial structure. Each trial
started with a requirement to ﬁxate a central point. One and a half
seconds later, this point disappeared and four white squares (1
height and width) appeared along the screen diagonals, 7 from
screen centre. People then were free to visually search the display:
when the participant’s ﬁxation position was within 2 of one of the
four placeholders, the contents of that location was revealed. If a
distracter location was being ﬁxated, that placeholder square
turned red, and only turned back to white after the gaze position
left the threshold distance. If ﬁxation was within threshold dis-
tance of the target, the white placeholder turned green and a sound
was played to indicate successfully ﬁnding the target. The target
remained green for 1.5 s to aid short term memory of the target’s
location on that trial. After this time, the screen was blanked, leav-
ing only a central ﬁxation blob, ready for the next trial to begin.
2.1.4. Experimental conditions
A Markov chain was used to determine the target’s location
over time. This Markov chain had four states that represented each
of the four possible spatial locations that the target could occupy.
The initial location of a target in the ﬁrst trial was chosen uni-formly randomly, and the target then subsequently had a probabil-
ity of pij = P(xt = jjxt1 = i) from moving from location i to location j.
These transition probabilities p were deﬁned for each condition as
shown in Fig. 2b. Over each block of 100 trials, the target locations
were deﬁned as x = x1,x2, . . . ,x100.
Condition 1 had entirely random, unpredictable target location
behaviour in order to measure people’s default search behaviour.
Based on previous ﬁndings it is predicted that people will display
a bias to reinspect previous target locations.
If transient facilitation was the result of a hard-wired, non-
adaptive mechanism, target location reinspections would persist
regardless of the environmental statistics. So in condition 2, targets
never repeated their location, and in condition 3 targets repeated
on 50% of trials (twice chance levels of 25%). This will distinguish
between a hard-wired vs. an adaptive mechanism underlying
occulomotor prediction.
In condition 4, targets exhibit a spatial bias to appear on one
side of the screen 80% of the time. By examining exploration
behaviour conditional upon previous target location, we can see
to what extent transient facilitation (location priming) is
responsible.
Condition 5 is akin to the manipulations by Walthew and Gil-
christ (2006) and Nummela, Lovejoy, and Krauzlis (2008): Targets
still have an overall spatial bias (occurring on one side of the screen
80% of the time) but targets never repeat their previous location.
This allows one to separate any effects of adapting to the statistical
structure of the environment (which requires learning 2nd order
statistics) from location repetitions.
Conditions 4 and 5 had an 80:20 spatial bias to one side of the
screen. The high probability side was randomised for each subject,
but was taken into account in the analysis such that location 1 and
2 represent the high probability locations.
2.1.5. Analyses
An exploration sequence was determined for each search trial.
Saccade landing positions within 2 radius of an item was counted
as an exploration. Multiple consecutive explorations of the same
location were collapsed to a single exploration. Any saccade land-
ing outside of the 2 threshold did not contribute to the exploration
sequence. Initial central ﬁxation was removed leaving the ﬁrst en-
try in the exploration sequence as the ﬁrst location actively ex-
plored by the participant.
People’s search behaviour was quantiﬁed into a ﬁrst exploration
matrix, fi,j which was deﬁned as the number of times that a target
was previously in location i, followed by a ﬁrst exploration in loca-
tion j. This measure could then be compared to ﬁrst explored loca-
tions produced by either the probabilistic or the mechanistic
models described below. This measure aims to capture the location
in which participants think the target is most likely to occur in.
The ﬁrst exploration matrix does not capture how search may
unfold in cases where the target was not located on the ﬁrst explo-
ration. A simple search proﬁle was calculated, capturing the pro-
portion of trials in which either 1, 2, 3, or 4 explorations were
required to locate the target.
2.1.6. Models
Four models were examined, see Fig. 1. Each model was ex-
posed to a series of 100 trials (as were the participants) where
the target locations x were sampled from the transition probabili-
ties p. The models have a number of units with a level of activity, q.
For the 1st order models there were four internal units, and the
2nd order models had 16 units representing each possible transi-
tion. The models assuming the world was static was updated using
Eq. (2) where k is ﬁxed at zero. This amounts to these models keep-
ing a running frequency count of each location or frequency. The
models assuming the world was dynamic were updated using Eq.
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Fig. 2. Experimental procedures. The trial structure used in Experiments 1 and 2 is shown in panel (a). The letters ‘t’ and ‘d’ are illustrative and did not appear in the actual
experiment. Each trial continued until participants located the target. The statistics of target location behaviour (p) are shown in panel (b) for the ﬁve different conditions
examined. The normalised sum of each row of the transition probabilities gives the overall spatial bias (red cells). Columns sum to 1, representing that the target has to occur
at one location on every trial.
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search block, model activities were initialised as zero, representing
no prior information or assumptions about the environmental sta-
tistics. The models explored each location in descending order of
unit activations, and where appropriate (for the 2nd order models)
it was assumed that the model always correctly remembered the
target’s previous location.
The model predictions resulted in an exploration order of all 4
item locations for each trial such that the ﬁrst exploration metric
could be compared to that of the models. In order to obtain average
model predictions (not parochial to one individual target location
sequence) this was repeated 50,000 times per condition.
The static models have no free parameters, whereas the dy-
namic models have 1 free parameter, the leak rate which was as-
sessed over the range 0 6 k < 1. The model predictions presented
of dynamic models were those corresponding to the maximum
likelihood leak rate. The log likelihood of the parameters given
the data is calculated using the multinomial distribution, summing
likelihoods over each location and previous target location, j
lnðLðmijjfijÞÞ /
XN
j¼1
XN
i¼1
fij lnðmi;jÞ: ð3Þ
This compares the ﬁrst ﬁxation counts f to set of model predictions
expressed as proportions. These predictions mij were deﬁned as the
proportion of times a model ﬁrst explored location jwhen the target
was in location i on the previous trial.3. Results
3.1. Exploration behaviour and model predictions
Fig. 3 shows ﬁrst exploration behaviour (points and 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals) for each condition. These are also compared to
model predictions (grey bars). In condition 1, people demonstrated
slight transient facilitation in that they were more likely to ﬁrst ex-
plore the target’s location on the previous trial. The fact that this is
not adaptive, as targets are unpredictable, is consistent with the
ﬁndings of Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996). In condition 2, targetsnever repeated their previous location, and people exhibited tran-
sient inhibition, or negative location priming. In condition 3, targets
repeated their location on 50% of trials and people exhibited a
higher level of transient facilitation than in condition 1. In condi-
tion 4, people’s ﬁrst explorations were more adaptive if the target
was previously on the high probability side: they showed transient
facilitation and a generally higher total probability of ﬁrst explor-
ing the high probability side. If the target was previously on the
low probability side, exploration behaviour was mixed, but with
a subtle indication of remaining transient facilitation. Transient
facilitation however was not present in condition 5 where targets
never repeated their previous location (just as in condition 2). In-
stead, there was a high chance that people would ﬁrst explore
the high probability side, regardless of the target’s previous
location.
Examining the model predictions (Fig. 3, grey bars), shows that
all models predict a degree of transient facilitation in conditions 1
and 3. Models that represent transitions predicted the transient
inhibition, however the 2nd order static model predicted zero
‘look-backs’ and the 2nd order dynamic model accurately captured
the partial transient inhibition that people exhibited. In conditions
4 and 5 the 1st order models provided poor qualitative ﬁts to peo-
ple’s exploration behaviour.3.2. Quantitative model evaluation
Fig. 4 (top) shows quantitative evaluation of the models. Each
model was evaluated in terms of a likelihood measure (see Meth-
ods), but because the models with the static assumption have 0
parameters while the dynamic models have 1 parameter, the like-
lihood score was transformed using the Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC measure), deﬁned as AIC = 2k  2ln(L), where L is the
likelihood and k is the number of free parameters (Akaike, 1974,
Burnham & Anderson, 2004). This AIC measure penalises models
with more parameters and so the model ﬁts can be compared even
though they have different numbers of parameters. The AIC values
shown in Fig. 4 have been normalised relative to a control model
that explores uniformly randomly. Therefore models with negative
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Fig. 3. First exploration behaviour of participants in Experiment 1 under ﬁve different sets of environmental statistics. The probability of people ﬁrst exploring locations 1–4
are shown (circles) as a function of the targets previous location (shown in bold on x-axis). Error bars show 95% conﬁdence intervals based upon multinomial distributions.
Grey bars represent the predictions of each model. Filled circles highlight ﬁrst exploring the previous target location. Search proﬁles in the right column show the proportion
of target located on the nth exploration alongside predictions of the 2nd order dynamic model.
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chance, and the lower the AIC value the better.
There is variation in model ﬁts, for example all models are bet-
ter than chance as explanations for search in condition 3, but only
1 model is better than chance in condition 5. The most important
result is that the only model that is (a) consistently better than
chance, and (b) comes ﬁrst or joint ﬁrst place, is the model that
represents 2nd order statistics and that assumes the world is
dynamic.4. Experiment 2
While the results of Experiment 1 indicate that we can learn
2nd order statistics, and that we do assume the world is dynamic,
Experiment 2 saught to explore this further. More speciﬁcally, is it
possible for people to maximise exploration performance by
assuming the world is stationary when they are (a) informed that
it is unchanging, and (b) when they have ﬁrst hand observations of
the unchanging rule over nearly 1 h of exploration time. If people
can treat the world as static then they should be able to quickly
learn to always visit the high probability locations ﬁrst (see dashed
blue lines in Fig. 5). But if not, simulations predict that ﬁrst explo-rations to high probability locations should increase to a steady
state between 80% and 100% of the time.
4.1. Methods
Seven participants were run in ﬁve consecutive blocks of 100
trials, none were excluded from analysis. Instructions to the partic-
ipants were identical to Experiment 1 with one exception. They
were informed that the rule governing target behaviour would re-
main the same throughout the entire experiment. They were not
informed what this behaviour would be, but they were exposed
to condition 4 (an 80:20 spatial bias) over all blocks.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Model evaluation
Model ﬁts (Fig. 4, bottom)again vary in their ability to account for
people’s exploration behaviour, but a number of important points
emerge. The 2nd order dynamic model was again the only model
that could account for search behaviour better than a control model
over all subjects. However, subjects 1, 2, 5, and 6were best ﬁt by the
1st order dynamicmodel. So the results of Experiments 1 and2were
consistent in their support for people assuming the world is dy-
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Fig. 4. Quantitative model evaluation. Fit of each of the four models (see legend) to
search behaviour in ﬁve conditions is shown for Experiment 1 (top). Model ﬁts to
individual participants behaviour in blocks 3–5 of Experiment 2 are shown
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procedure on the participants exploration behaviour. Maximum likelihood leak
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spatial locations while some represented transitions.4.2.2. Exploration over time
Fig. 5 shows an analysis of search over all ﬁve blocks. The mea-
sure used was the proportion of ﬁrst explorations that were direc-
ted to one of the high probability locations. The dashed blue line
shows the 20-trial moving average of the 1st order static model ex-
posed to the exact same target sequence that the participants saw.
If people behaved according to this model, then they should be able
to rapidly learn to always visit of the high probability locations
ﬁrst. However while some of the participants did so often, none
managed to do this all of the time. Solid black lines show the 20-
trial moving average of the observer’s behaviour. Grey lines and
shaded grey regions show mean and 95% conﬁdence intervals of
the proportion for each block.
Based on other simulations, on average the models should rap-
idly reach between 80% and 100% ﬁrst explorations to the high
probability side. Anything below this is was not explicable in terms
of this model.
The key point here is that none of the participants consistently
always looked at the high probability region ﬁrst, and so there is
not much support for the idea that these subjects, under these con-
ditions, managed to override their assumption that the world was
dynamic.5. General discussion
5.1. Combining predictions and observations
In order to focus upon the nature in which top-down predic-
tions are made based upon previous target locations it is necessary
to avoid confounds from the feature properties of targets and
distracters. It is known from visual priming experiments that the
feature identity of targets and distracters, and location interact in
complex ways (Campana & Casco, 2009; Hillstrom, 2000; Huang,
Holcombe, & Pashler, 2004; Kristjansson & Driver, 2008; Maljkovic
& Nakayama, 1994, 1996; McBride, Leonards, & Gilchrist, 2008).
The gaze contingent search task used here excluded visual cues
from contributing at the start of search and only played a role as
items were ﬁxed (see Fig. 2). This slightly decreases the ecological
validity, but any adaptive oculomotor search behaviours can be
attributed exclusively to the past location of targets and the statis-
tical rules governing their behaviour. The results presented are not
sufﬁcient to show that these predictions could have been com-
bined with visual evidence had it been available. However, it seems
entirely plausible as Liston and Stone (2008) did ﬁnd this to be the
case. It was also found in a covert search paradigm that visual evi-
dence was able to be combined in a near-optimal manner with
spatial predictions (Vincent, 2011). This does not imply that the
same holds for overt search however.5.2. People adapt their occulomotor exploration to the statistics of the
environment
Participants in Experiment 1 searched in a manner indicating
that they were able to learn both 1st and 2nd order statistics that
governed target location behaviour and search in an adaptive man-
ner even within very short search blocks of 100 trials. People’s de-
fault behaviour in an unpredictable environment was one of
transient facilitation, consistent with Maljkovic and Nakayama
(1996). This transient facilitation was ampliﬁed when targets re-
peated their location 50% of the time (condition 3) but was re-
versed (showing transient inhibition) when targets never
repeated their location (condition 2). When there is a spatial bias
(condition 4) people explored high probability locations ﬁrst and
there was somewhat of a transient repetition effect. However,
when there was an identical spatial bias but no location repeats
(condition 5), it was clear that search prioritised the non-repeating
high probability location: a result that could not have been ex-
plained by transient facilitation. Overall, the results are consistent
with the notion that we can adapt to the prevailing statistics of the
environment (Anderson & Carpenter, 2006; Druker & Anderson,
2010; Farrell et al., 2009; Geng & Behrmann, 2005; Jones & Kas-
chak, 2012; Miller, 1988; Nummela, Lovejoy, & Krauzlis, 2008;
Shaw & Shaw, 1977).5.3. 1st vs. 2nd order statistics
In Experiment 1, the model which was able to learn 2nd order
statistics was the best, most robust account of human exploration
behaviour over all conditions (see Fig. 4a). These results support
previous ﬁndings that we can learn transition probabilities in a be-
tween-trial context (Nummela, Lovejoy, & Krauzlis, 2008) or a
within-trial context (Farrell et al., 2009). In Experiment 2, the re-
sults are less clear cut: Fig. 4b shows that some people act as if they
are just learning 1st order statistics and some act as if they learn
2nd order statistics. This may be a false distinction however. Learn-
ing the 2nd order statistics also captures the 1st order statistics.
However, doing so requires the estimation of 16 transition proba-
bilities as opposed to only 4 spatial probabilities. So a sensible
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Fig. 5. Time-course of exploration behaviour in Experiment 2. Over ﬁve blocks of an 80:20 probability bias (condition 4) solid black lines show the 20-trial moving average of
the proportion of ﬁrst explorations to the a high probability location. This measure for the predictions of the 1st order static model is shown in the dashed blue line. None of
the subjects were able to consistently always explore the high probability region ﬁrst. Grey lines and shaded regions showmeans and 95% conﬁdence intervals for each block.
B.T. Vincent / Vision Research 74 (2012) 93–101 99strategy would be to simultaneously track both 1st and 2nd order
statistics (see Wilder, Jones, & Mozer, 2009; Yu & Cohen, 2009).
5.4. Belief in a constant vs. a changing world
In Experiment 1, it was clear that the best account of explora-
tion behaviour was given by a model that assumes the world is dy-
namic. This assumption means that information from the past is
gradually forgotten in favour of new information. Clearly this is
useful if the world is actually dynamic (Anderson & Carpenter,
2006), but results in suboptimal performance if the world is actu-
ally unchanging. This is simply because if old information decays
then one simply has a smaller sample size from which to calculate
long run relative frequencies.
Are we constrained to make suboptimal predictions in static
environments? Experiment 2 tested to see if we could overcome
the dynamic world assumption if people were told the statistics
underlying target behaviour does not change, and through direct
experience of searching in a static world. Fig. 4b shows that acrossseven subjects, the models that account for exploration the best are
those that assume the world is dynamic.
Fig. 5 also shows that, under the conditions tested, all observers
failed to explore in a manner consistent with assuming the world
was static. These results certainly do not prove that it is impossible,
but it did not happen despite task instruction and nearly 1 h worth
of searching.
This may have implications for optimal observer modelling. One
reason why suboptimal learning may be observed (e.g. Droll,
Abbey, & Eckstein, 2009) is because we are suboptimal for experi-
mental situations with unchanging statistics and are instead
optimised to a dynamic changing world.
5.5. Insights into transient facilitation
Experiment 1 showed that transient facilitation seemed to be a
default strategy. This was ampliﬁed when it was appropriate (con-
dition 3) and attenuated when targets never repeated their previ-
ous location (conditions 2 and 5). Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996)
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Fig. 6. The relation between transient facilitation and the rate of discounting the
past. This simulation was of the model representing spatial locations only, with the
assumption that the world is dynamic. Results for ﬁve different leak rates k are
shown.
100 B.T. Vincent / Vision Research 74 (2012) 93–101proposed that this could be the result of a resistor–capacitor mod-
el, that causes transient facilitation which is useful in some real-
world search situations. It is interesting to reinterpret transient
facilitation in the light of the approach of Anderson and Carpenter
(2006) who describe a very similar model (a leaky integrator)
framed in terms of our beliefs of how changeable the world is.
Fig. 6 shows the results of the location only, dynamic model to
50,000 simulated blocks of random target movement behaviour
(condition 1). Plotted are the prior probabilities (activations q,
transformed by the softmax operation) of the target to repeat its
location n trials back in the past. This was done using Eq. (1) for
a range of k parameters. As the leak rate increases (discounting
the past more rapidly) the transient facilitation effect increases
in magnitude and decreases in duration. While this result could
be argued to simply provide quantitative support to the predic-
tions of Maljkovic and Nakayama (1996), I would argue that com-
bining it with the insights of Anderson and Carpenter (2006)
allows one to explain transient facilitation not as the result of an
arbitrary heuristic mechanism, but as a by-product of assuming
the world is changeable.5.6. Conclusion
People conducted a gaze contingent visual search task with no
visual cues as to the target’s location. This was only available once
an item location was ﬁxated, and the only way how search could
become more efﬁcient was for the participants to learn any under-
lying rules governing the targets location behaviour over time. Five
different sets of statistical rules were examined with a mixture of
1st and 2nd order statistics. It was found that exploration behav-
iour of participants adapted to make search more efﬁcient in all
ﬁve search conditions. This suggests that people are able to learn
both 1st and 2nd order statistics, supportive of previous ﬁndings.
The present work strengthened this case by showing that explora-
tion behaviour adapts to many different kinds of environmental
statistics. This was further supported by the ability of a 2nd order
model to account for people’s exploration behaviour.
The results also suggest that people’s internal predictive models
make the assumption that the world is dynamic. This was shown
both in Experiment 1 where a 2nd order dynamic model provided
consistently good accounts of exploration behaviour, but a 2nd or-
der static model did not. This assumption that the world is change-
able may also account for some previously observed transient
facilitatory effects. Experiment 2 also showed that, despite task
instructions that the target statistics would not change and directexperience of searching in such a static environment for nearly 1 h,
occulomotor predictions were unable to act as if they believed the
environmental statistics were static. This has implications for opti-
mal observer modelling of human behaviour: when we step into a
simpliﬁed experimental procedure we may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to over-
ride assumptions that serve us well in a complex dynamic world.Acknowledgments
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